DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 280 095 CS 505 537

AUTHOR Zimmermann, Stephanie
TITLE The Return to Messages: Perspectives on Discourse Analysis and Conversational Coherence.
PUB DATE Apr 87
NOTE 49p.; Paper presented at the Joint Meeting of the Central States Speech Association and the Southern Speech Communication Association (St. Louis, MO, April 9-12, 1987).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Information Analyses (070) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Codification; *Coherence; Communication (Thought Transfer); *Communication Research; *Cooperation; *Coordination; *Discourse Analysis; Interpersonal Communication; Models; Research Opportunities
IDENTIFIERS *Conversation

ABSTRACT

Focusing on the increasing attention of communication scholars to the production of conversation, this paper outlines three broad perspectives on discourse analysis: (1) codification, which involves discrete categorizing of discourse and includes work in speech act theory, traditional interaction analysis, and message strategies; (2) coordination, which requires a search for mechanisms that coordinate conversation exchanges and focus on the structure of discourse, cognitive rules, and resource exchange models of discourse; and (3) cooperation, which views communicators as active, goal seeking agents in understanding the production of conversation and is concerned with cooperative dialogue and contexts for conversation. The historical development of each perspective is sketched, and within each one of these some theoretical approaches concerned with conversational coherence are discussed. In addition, each perspective is examined in terms of the felicity conditions suggested by W. Pearce and V. Cronen, who argue that a theory should be evaluated on the basis of its utility. The paper's analysis of codification, coordination, and cooperative models reveals critical issues and important differences in various scholars' conceptualizations of conversation. The utility of the cooperative perspective in examining the accomplishment of coherent discourse is demonstrated. Suggestions for future directions in message analysis and researching conversational coherence are offered. (Seven pages of references are provided). (JD)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED280095

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

The Return to Messages: Perspectives on Discourse Analysis and Conversational Coherence

Stephanie Zimmermann

Department of Communication
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0042
(606) 257-4099

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Stephanie Zimmermann

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Paper presented at the joint Central/Southern States Speech Convention, St. Louis, April 1987.

The author would like to thank Dr. James L. Applegate for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

CS505537

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Abstract

Communication scholars, as well as social scientists in other disciplines, have recently begun to focus increasing attention on the production of conversation. This "return to messages" is evident in the interpersonal, organizational, and mass communication literature. For discourse analysts, the necessity of examining messages in order to understand human behavior is taken for granted. How to approach the study of conversation and the organization of discourse is, however, open to discussion and debate.

The purpose of the present paper is to outline three broad perspectives on discourse analysis: codification, coordination, and cooperation. These perspectives more or less follow an historical development, with some theoretical approaches within each general area more concerned with conversational coherence than others. Analysis of codification, coordination, and cooperative models reveals critical issues and important differences in conceptualizations of conversation. The utility of the cooperative perspective in examining the accomplishment of coherent discourse is demonstrated.

The Return to Messages: Perspectives on Discourse Analysis and Conversational Coherence

"To continue," continued the minister impatiently. "Once a week by Royal Proclamation the word market is held here in the great square and people come from everywhere to buy the words they need or trade in the words they haven't used."

"Our job," said the count, "is to see that all the words sold are the proper ones, for it wouldn't do to sell someone a word that had no meaning or didn't exist at all. For instance, if you bought a word like ghlbtsk, where would you use it?"

"It would be difficult," thought Milo--but there were so many words that were difficult, and he knew hardly any of them.

"But we never choose which ones to use," explained the earl as they walked toward the market stalls, "for as long as they mean what they mean to mean we don't care if they make sense or nonsense."

"Innocence or magnificence," added the count.

"Reticence or common sense," said the undersecretary.

"That seems simple enough," said Milo, trying to be polite.

"Easy as falling off a log," cried the earl, falling off a log with a loud thump.

"Must you be so clumsy?" shouted the duke.

"All I said was----" began the earl, rubbing his head.

"We heard you," said the minister angrily, "and you'll have to find an expression that's less dangerous."

The earl dusted himself off as the others snickered audibly.

"You see," cautioned the count, "you must pick your words very carefully and be sure to say just what you intend to say. And now we must leave to make preparations for the Royal Banquet."

"You'll be there of course," said the minister.

But before Milo had a chance to say anything, they were rushing off across the square as fast as they had come.

"Enjoy yourself in the market," shouted back the undersecretary.

"Market," recited the duke: "an open space or covered building in which---"

And that was the last Milo heard as they disappeared into the crowd.

"I never knew words could be so confusing," Milo said to Tock as he bent down to scratch the dog's ear.

"Only when you use a lot to say a little," answered Tock. (Juster, 1961, pp. 42-44).

Milo's adventures in The Lands Beyond take him to Dictionopolis at the Foothills of Confusion, through the Forest of Sight to Point of View, transport him to the Island of Conclusions in the Sea of Knowledge, and finally to the Mountains of Ignorance where he conquers the evil demons and saves the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Wisdom. During his travels, Milo learns that reality depends on one's point of view, jumping to conclusions is easy, but getting back is difficult, and most importantly for our present concerns, Milo discovers that messages are central to everyday life.

Communication scholars, of course, would have explained that latter point to Milo had he asked, possibly saving the boy from a harrowing journey. Or would they? Like Milo, communication scholars seem to have ventured into The Lands Beyond, searching for the Sea of Knowledge, only to find themselves at the Foothills of Confusion. As Miller and Knapp (1985) have observed, "It was not clear what distinguished communication studies from other social science investigations" (p. 15).

There has been a call recently throughout the discipline to "get back to basics" and focus on messages. This emphasis on message analysis has been advocated by theorists in interpersonal communication (e.g., Knapp & Miller, 1985), organizational communication (e.g., Carbaugh, 1985; Conrad, 1985), and mass communication (e.g., Bennett & Edelman, 1985). For example, in discussing current themes in interpersonal communication literature, Mill[illegible] and Knapp (1985) note the present trend "to assert a distinguishing identity for communication studies by focusing specifically on the analysis of message components" (p. 15). Carbaugh (1985), conceptualizing organizations as

cultures, argues that analyzing cultural codes requires "exploring the discourse for relevant sequential terms or recurring causal patterns" (p. 40). And it is not only communication researchers who have shifted their attention to discourse. Knapp (1984) observes that, "Scholars from a wide variety of academic disciplines have been exploring the nature of conversations in recent years" (p. 10).

The need to focus on messages in understanding human phenomena is not a new issue for those communication scholars who have pursued inquiry in discourse analysis. These theorists have long realized that "the real significance of understanding the structure of conversations is its centrality for understanding human interaction in general" (Knapp, 1984, p. 10). However, for those interested in examining conversational phenomena, the path may be an uncertain one. "The speed with which this body of literature (discourse analysis) has developed and the diversity of the sources of information have made it difficult for many interested professionals to keep abreast of knowledge in this area" (Knapp, 1984, p. 10). To borrow from Milo, "We never knew words could be so confusing." The task of this paper is to sort through some of the confusion associated with the various approaches to discourse analysis, and provide suggestions for future directions in message analysis and researching conversational coherence.

Perspectives on Discourse Analysis

The study of discourse can be divided into three general areas which more or less follow an historical development. The first, codification, involves the discrete categorizing of discourse. This perspective includes work in speech act theory (e.g., Austin, 1962), traditional interaction analysis

(e.g., Millar & Rogers, 1976), and message strategies (e.g., Cody, et al, 1981). The second, coordination, requires a search for mechanisms which coordinate conversation exchanges. Conversational analysts focusing on the structure of discourse (e.g., Cody & McLaughlin, 1985a), those interested in cognitive rules (e.g., Tracy, 1985), and resource exchange models of discourse (e.g., Roloff & Campion, 1985) fall within the coordination perspective of discourse analysis. The third, cooperation, views communicators as active, goal-seeking agents in understanding the production of conversation. Researchers in this perspective are concerned with cooperative dialogue (e.g., Jacobs, 1985) and contexts for conversation (e.g., Putnam, 1985).

This paper examines theories within each of these perspectives in terms of the felicity conditions suggested by Pearce and Cronen (1980). These authors argue that rather than judging a theory true or false, a theory should be evaluated on the basis of its utility. The notion of felicity conditions is grounded in speech act theory, and refers to conditions which must be met for something to be accomplished well. For a theory to be accomplished well, it should:

1) permit the integration of phenomena, i.e., have generality;

2) specify some necessity, i.e., show why phenomena are the way they are, not just that the phenomena exist;

3) have generative capacity, i.e., allow the theorist to explain, understand, and develop new ideas;

4) not be discrepant with empirical data; and

5) include the notion of recursivity, i.e., the theory can account for the theorist having developed it.

As Pearce and Cronen (1980) note, these felicity conditions are not necessarily complete, but do offer a framework for assessing a theory's utility. This provides a crucial shift away from truth claims, to evaluating a theory's power to enhance our understanding of communicative phenomena. Thus the question is not, "Has this theory met the conditions for Truth?" but rather, "How well does a particular theory of discourse analysis describe, explain, and predict the accomplishment of coherent conversation?" Answering that question will be the task of the following sections.

Codification of Discourse

Discourse analysis concerned with codification follows the normative code model based on Chomsky's theory of transformational generative grammar (Jacobs, 1985). Hence a brief discussion of his approach is included here. This provides insights into the second theory discussed, speech act theory, which includes the works of Searle, Austin, and Grice (Cicourel, 1980). Interaction analysis, which uses as its unit of observation the inter- or transact, is a third area of codification in discourse analysis. The final area of research concern in codification is that of classifying message strategies and situational factors which may influence the selection of strategies. Although recent scholars of discourse analysis, and more specifically those concerned with conversational coherence, have sharply criticized the utility of these lines of research (Cicourel, 1980; Jacobs, 1985; O'Keefe, et al, 1980), codification approaches have greatly influenced thought and study in discourse analysis, and in this respect merit attention.

The Linguistic Tradition. "'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously'" (Coulthard, 1977, p. 2) summarizes the basic argument of linguistic study: Structure and meaning are distinctly separate. Chomsky, the most notable linguist in modern times (Jacobs, 1985), was concerned with the syntax of language and the knowledge necessary to construct grammatical sequences. He was not, however, concerned with the performance of language users, directing his theorizing to the ideal speaker-hearer (O'Keefe & Delia, in press). In fact, Chomsky asserted that linguists should not analyze naturally-occurring speech or written texts. He reasoned that this data reflected the application of grammatical knowledge, not the knowledge itself, and therefore would be mediated by factors idiosyncratic to the individual.

Chomsky's work was guided by the metatheoretical assumptions of rationalism (Pearce, et al, 1982). The dichotomy Plato envisioned of reality/appearances is found in Chomsky's linguistic competence/linguistic performance. Arriving at what linguistic competence entails requires careful thought and deduction by the theorist. "The underlying competence is the same for all native speakers and therefore can be studied in the production of any one individual, usually the linguist (her/) himself who proceeds by introspection, checking potential sentences for grammaticality against (her/) his intuitions" (Coulthard, 1977, p. 3). However, this search for structure through thoughtful deduction has proved to be difficult.

While Chomsky's transformational grammar approach provided insights into the structure of language, his neglect of meaning led to glaring discrepancies with empirical data (Coulthard, 1977). The uniformity in competence among native speakers of a language could not be found, and linguists began to

realize that grammar and meaning were intricately linked. As Coulthard (1977) notes: "Thus, the results of empirical investigation have forced many transformational linguists to recognise the importance of context and to join in a series of disciplines converging on the study of situated speech" (p. 3). The separation of meaning and structure also prohibits the integration of language phenomena, restricting the theory's generality. In arguing that "language exists as a structure in the human mind quite distinct from any act of communication" (Pearce, et al, 1982, p. 15), Chomsky clearly separates transformational linguistics from human communication theory.

Rationalist methodology, which underlies transformational linguistics, fails to explain why communication phenomena exist as they do. In separating reality and appearances, the former is assumed to be stable and perfect, and beyond any form of explanation (Pearce, et al, 1982). For Chomsky, this meant that uniform grammatical structures exist, and it is the role of the theorist to describe what these structures are, not why. This assumption that knowledge exists in an unchanging reality, then, negates the ability of transformational linguists to explain linguistic phenomena, and more importantly, to develop new ideas.

Recursivity cannot be addressed from a methodology of rationalism, as Pearce, et al (1982) state: "The basic assumptions of the ancient Greeks precluded them from discovering the recursiveness of human knowledge" (p. 12). Perceptions are denied as a part of knowledge, in that knowledge is the description of an already existing "true" reality. Chomsky's embracing of this metatheoretical framework denied his ability to theorize.

The narrow focus of the transformational linguists on language syntax prohibits this approach from being a useful one for discourse analysts. Because the performance of language is not considered appropriate for study, this is not a theory of human communication. "Chomsky is blissfully unconcerned about performance; he argues that it is the unpredictable and unaccountable result of a combination of language and the personality variables of the speaker" (Pearce, et al, 1982, p. 15).

It is important, however, to understand Chomsky's reasoning because his efforts influenced the pursuits of discourse analysts such as Austin and his student Searle. These two linguistic philosophers (Coulthard, 1977) took the opposing view of the traditional linguists, who were concentrating on form, and tackled the issues related to meaning. What developed was their tremendously influential theory of speech acts.

Speech Act Theory. In charting the course of scholarly thought on communication, Pearce and Cronen (1980) locate Austin and Searle within what is termed action theory. Inquiry within this theoretical framework conceptualizes communication as action, and was a direct response to the inadequacies of positivism in understanding human communication. "The failure of operationalism cleared the way for the development of a radically new concept of communication. The essence of the new concept is that communication is a form of action persons perform toward or in the context of others" (Pearce & Cronen, 1980, p. 75). The title of Austin's (1962) text, How to Do Things With Words, is evidence of this conceptualization of language.

Initially Austin argued that language, and more specifically utterances, did not always describe reality. Many utterances were actually performances. Later, Austin "demonstrated that in fact all utterances are performative" (Coulthard, 1977, p. 17). Further, he argued that utterances could not be evaluated by truth conditions. Rather, language usages are best described by felicity conditions, or the degree to which utterances are performed well (McLaughlin, 1984).

Speech act theorists are primarily concerned with language as a social act, or the illocutionary force of an utterance. An illocutionary act is performed well if the felicity conditions for the act are met, such that the hearer recognizes the speaker's intentions (McLaughlin, 1984). Utterances also include a locutionary act, which is the referent of the utterance, and a perlocutionary effect, or the non-linguistic outcome of the illocutionary and locutionary acts (Coulthard, 1977). The locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts can be performed simultaneously. For example, imagine that Jane said to Sally, "Would you please take Spot for a walk?" The locutionary act refers to "Spot" as Spot, "you" as Sally, and "walk" as walk. The illocutionary act is Jane requesting or commanding Sally to take Spot for a walk. The perlocutionary act refers to Sally complying with Jane's directive. It is in this manner that locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts can be performed at the same time, yet separated for purposes of analysis (Coulthard, 1977).

The goal of speech act theorists is the classification of discourse into a set of finite categories developed from the identification of different illocutionary forces (Cicourel, 1980). The emphasis is on a search for rules

which govern speakers' performances of illocutionary acts. Searle, employing a language game metaphor (Pearce & Cronen, 1980), posits two sets of language rules: 1) regulative, which are the stylistic or tactical rules that specify the permissible acts or act sequences for a given situation; and 2) constitutive rules "which control the ways in which a given utterance of a given form is heard as realising a given illocutionary act" (Coulthard, 1977, p. 23). Constitutive rules specify what must be done in order to play the game, and regulative rules indicate how behaviors should be performed within the game.

In addition to Austin and Searle, Grice has been influential in speech act theorizing (Cicourel, 1980). His cooperative principle "refers to a kind of directive to the speaker to formulate all aspects of his or her utterance in a way that permits participants of a conversation to facilitate to the utmost the achievement of the tacitly agreed upon aims of the conversation" (Coulthard, 1977, p. 103). Based on the assumption of a cooperative principle inherent in the conversational system, Grice posits four conventions or maxims, quality, quantity, relevancy, and manner, "which if adopted will result in cooperative contribution" (McLaughlin, 1984, p. 32). When conversation behaviors are not in line with these maxims, the situation indicates that the cooperative principle is not being applied. This results in the notion of conversational implicature, requiring interpretive procedures to understand the discrepant behaviors (McLaughlin, 1984).

The search for rules, maxims, and conventions within the conversational system, implicates the methodology which guides speech act theory, that of rational empiricism. Phenomena exist as they do because there is an order in

the world, paralleling the order in the mind, which can be detected (Pearce, et al, 1982). The nature of the necessity, then, for speech act theorists, is that speech acts exist as they do because of the order in conversation that is a reflection of the order in the human mind. For example, Grice "attempted to identify, using Aristotelian logic as a model, a set of categories in the human mind that makes observed patterns necessary" (Pearce, et al, 1982, p. 16). While this is an attempt to describe and explain observed phenomena, the limitation is in the assumption of isomorphism between the mind and observed behavioral patterns, on which the discrete categorization of all phenomena is based.

The classification process leads to an integration of a wider range of communication phenomena than that allowed by transformational linguistics. For example, in discussing indirect speech acts, Searle expands his position to include, "the cooperative principle of Grice, shared factual background knowledge between speaker and hearer, and the latter's ability to make inferences" (Cicourel, 1980, p. 104). Further, speech act theory has greatly enhanced the understanding of what it means to "have a conversation" by conceptualizing communication as action, rather than a description of reality. The power of this theory lies within the "act" of speech acts, and its generative capacity to develop new ways of doing discourse analysis.

One limitation of speech act theory, however, is the lack of empirical data to support these theorists' propositions. This situation is inherent in rational empiricist methodology. "The method of rational empiricism is the explication of a rational order within the array of sensible experiences" (Pearce, et al, 1982, p. 16). Researchers classify data, typically

transcripts of "simulated or actual exchanges" (Cicourel, 1980, p. 104) by fitting examples of previously determined categories into those categories. There is no search for "negative cases" or instances which are inconsistent with the categories chosen. For example, Pearce, et al (1982) assert that Grice "is frankly unimpressed by 'mere empirical generalizations'" (p. 16).

As a theory undergirded by the assumptions of rational empiricism, the speech act model does take the human mind and meaning into account in the production of utterances. However, the model cannot account for the process of theorizing. "The assumptions of this methodology (rational empiricism) make it unthinkable that the results of observation will in any important way force those assumptions to change" (Pearce, et al, 1982, p. 17).

The strength of speech act theory is that it allows for the organization of materials into discrete categories (Cicourel, 1980). The classification schemes, however, are concerned with singular speech acts as the unit of observation. Several researchers, also interested in the codification of conversation, have argued that the unit of observation must be the inter- or transact. It is to these interaction analysts that we will now turn.

Coding Speech Interacts. Whereas Austin, Searle, Grice, and other speech act theorists were guided by the Aristotelian logic of rational empiricism, interaction analysts such as Ellis (1979), Emery (1982), Mark (1971), Millar and Rogers (1976), and Rogers and Farace (1975), are guided by the logic of general systems theory (see, e.g., Millar & Rogers, 1976). The analysis of conversation for these researchers, is based on the principles of human communication set forth by Watzlawick, et al (1967). Message analysis is

grounded in the axiom: "Every communication has a content and a relationship aspect such that the latter classifies the former and is therefore a metacommunication" (Watzlawick, et al, 1967, p. 54). The rationale for the level of analysis as the inter- or transact in a conversational sequence (Millar & Rogers, 1976) rests on the assertion that "every item in the sequence is simultaneously a stimulus, response, and reinforcement" (Watzlawick, et al, 1967, p. 55). Each speech act is therefore coded in terms of the act preceding and the act following it.

Although interaction analysts agree with Watzlawick, et al (1967) that "all behavior is communicative" (Mark, 1971, p. 222), relational coding schemes have mainly focused on verbal exchanges. Mark (1971) argues that this is not a problem because "there is no evidence to indicate what one might gain by coding the non-verbal band of normal communication systems as it should be consistent with the verbal" (p. 229). Folger and Poole (1982) take issue with this position, noting that research has indicated that interactants rely heavily on nonverbal messages for relational interpretations. Rogers and Millar (1982) agree that not coding nonverbal behaviors has been a problem, and a few interaction analysts, such as Pike and Sillars (1985) have coded both verbal and nonverbal acts in dyadic communication.

In spite of the effort to integrate a broader range of communicative phenomena, interaction analysts still tend to remain concerned with only one relational issue, dominance (Fitzpatrick & Badzinski, 1985). While this is clearly an important relational and conversational concern, Burgoon & Hale (1984) identify eleven other themes or topoi in relational communication. In addition, coding schemes purporting to measure the same phenomenon, relational

control, do not produce the same results (O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1981). This calls into question the face and content validity of the coding schemes employed by interaction analysts.

The coding schemes also assume that conversation is linear and sequentially ordered over time. This view is discrepant with empirical data which indicates that conversations do not necessarily follow an orderly, predictable pattern across time (O'Keefe, et al, 1980). O'Keefe, et al (1980) argue from a constructivist position that traditional interaction analysts, bound to equating meaning with sequential patterns, are unable to account for the emergent nature of conversation. Some discourse analysts have recognized this problem. In studying high and low marital adjustment couples, Ting-Toomey's (1983) objective "was to examine whether similar verbal sequential patterns would emerge in the negotiation processes of nonclinical, normal-functioning marital couples" (p. 307). However, Ting-Toomey's (1983) analysis still places meaning in patterns over time, and assumes an orderliness in conversation where change has no meaning.

Traditional interaction analysis, then, categorizes communicative behaviors into discrete acts, searching for patterns or sequences of act classifications (O'Keefe, et al, 1980). This is consistent with the general systems' assumption explicated by Watzlawick, et al (1967): "The search for pattern is the basis of all scientific investigation. Where there is pattern there is significance--this epistemological maxim also holds for the study of human interaction" (p. 36). Meaning is found in the patterns delineated within conversational system, and patterns define the system boundaries. Interaction analysts, as system theorists, assume that "the system is then its own best

explanation" and explain why conversational phenomena exist as they do "with an answer which is descriptive rather than explanatory, that is on how and not why the interactional system operates" (Watzlawick, et al, 1967, pp. 129-130). The argument that the system explains itself leads to a circularity in reasoning and inadequately specifies the nature of the necessity in the production of coherent conversation (Littlejohn, 1983).

Although standard methods of interaction analysis are not useful in understanding the organization of interaction, O'Keefe, et al (1980) suggest that these methods are useful for other research questions, such as those concerned with the distribution rather than sequence of speech acts. This assertion is also relevant to the codification of message strategies and situational variables, which may enhance our understanding of message types, but not our understanding of conversational coherence.

Codification of Strategies and Situations. Two approaches have guided researchers who are interested in the classification of the strategies interactants employ in conversations and the situational constraints on message choices. One, incorporating human systems methodological assumptions (Pearce, et al, 1982), has been primarily concerned with compliance-gaining messages or persuasion. The second, informed by the constructivist tradition, has focused on the "person-centeredness" of message strategies (Burleson & Samter, 1985). These two approaches to the codification of message strategies and situational constraints lead researchers to ask very different questions, resulting in quite different answers about the nature of discourse.

Discourse analysts interested in persuasive strategies have primarily employed deductive methods in devising their classification schemes (Wiseman & Schenck-Hamlin, 1981). Criticizing deductive methods in this line of research, Wiseman and Schenck-Hamlin (1981) use an inductive approach to classify compliance-gaining message strategies. Willbrand and Rieke (1986) also use an inductively-derived set of message strategies for children's compliance-gaining discourse. Cody, et al (1981) and Dillard and Burgoon (1985) are concerned with situational variables and how these variables can predict an individual's choice of persuasive message strategies. Cody and McLaughlin (1985b), in a summary piece, discuss situational factors relevant to interpersonal communication research, clearly incorporating the human systems methodological assumptions of individual volition and multiple causality (Pearce, et al, 1982). However, in practice, researchers who have studied compliance-gaining strategies have tended to search for linear causal linkages between variables.

Jackson and Jacobs (1983) offer several criticisms of this line of research. They argue that the current practices of: 1) using one message to represent an entire message category, and 2) treating language as a fixed-effect, have led to serious problems with the generalizability of findings from these studies. The remedy for this situation is: "Starting now, we must reexamine many well-entrenched (but thinly supported) claims about communication, using better designs and more appropriate analysis" (Jackson & Jacobs, 1983, p. 178). These criticisms of research practices in message analysis also point to problems with generation of the data. For example, when following "the common practice of re-using messages that have 'worked' in previous studies" (Jackson & Jacobs, 1983, p. 172), there is the strong

possibility that the "theory" of compliance-gaining strategies is actually a "theory" of "Shade Trees" (one situation frequently used).

The preoccupation with quantitative methods has resulted in research with a very narrow scope, limiting its generative capacity and ability to integrate a wide-range of communicative phenomena. Researchers attempt to isolate situational variables such as relational consequences and intimacy (Cody, et al, 1981) rights, benefits, intimacy, and dominance (Dillard & Burgoon, 1985), or relational/marital type (Witteman & Fitzpatrick, 1986) and assess the influence of these variables on the choice of specific persuasive strategies. Wiseman and Schenck-Hamlin (1981) exhibit even greater evidence of tunnel-vision in their typology of compliance-gaining strategies. They assert that it is necessary to inductively derive a list of compliance-gaining strategies before addressing situational influences. By ignoring the situation, they have further reduced the integrative capacity of their approach.

There is little concern with explanation and description in the bulk of compliance-gaining research. Rather, this is an attempt to determine causal relationships between variables, such as degree of intimacy and message strategy chosen by the individual (Cody, et al, 1981). Explanation is in the form of statistical correlations, which do little to enhance the understanding of why or how conversations are produced. Thus, Cody, et al (1981) report: "Hypothesis 1 was supported: when relational intimacy was high, justification strategies were preferred in the short-term consequences situation . . . as opposed to the long-term consequences situation" (p. 100). This statement has little relevance as to how conversation is organized or produced, focusing instead on statistically-indicated effects of hypothetical situations on an individual's message choice.

This linearly causal and static view of communication phenomena leads researchers within this approach to codifying message strategies to deny the recursivity of human knowledge, and the process of theorizing. The emphasis on methods, without reflecting on the implications of metatheoretical assumptions, indicates the inability of these researchers to address the issues of knowing and reflexivity.

A sharp contrast to the compliance-gaining research is offered by constructivists, who take the standpoint that "the meanings made by perceivers are what count as data, and these data count as evidence of the nature of the activity of minds, as a description of the 'world-as-perceived' within which persons actually live, and/or as a basis for explaining and predicting a person's actions and responses to actions" (Pearce, et al, 1982, p. 23). It is to this latter concern that the research of Burleson (in press), Burleson and Samter (1985), and McQuillen (1986) is addressed.

In identifying the comforting (Burleson, in press; Burleson & Samter, 1985) and compliance-resisting strategies (McQuillen, 1986) employed by interactants, these researchers are attempting to integrate cognitive constructs with message construction. As Burleson (in press) notes, "The constructivist analysis of functional communication skill is based on an integration of the sociolinguistic theory of Bernstein (1975), the cognitive development theories of Piaget (e.g., 1926) and Werner (1957), and the 'Chicago School' of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969, Goffman, 1967)" (p. 9).

More specifically, Burleson (in press), Burleson and Samter (1985), and McQuillen (1986) are interested in the link between the development of person-

centered message strategies and the ability of a speaker "to infer and internally represent relevant psychological characteristics of the listener" (Burleson, in press, p. 21) i.e., the individual's underlying level of perspective-taking (McQuillen, 1986). Codification of strategies is in terms of the degree of a message's person-centeredness, resulting in a hierarchical ordering of message strategies. The higher levels in the hierarchy indicate greater sophistication of message strategy (Burleson, in press). Individuals choose particular strategies as a result of cognitive mechanisms, such that "individuals with more developed systems of interpersonal constructs should be more capable of producing highly person-centered messages" (Burleson, in press, p. 22). Thus, this approach to classifying message strategies both describes and explains why messages are chosen.

Although Burleson (in press) argues that representational validity is not necessary in this line of inquiry, he nonetheless pursues this issue in assessing the functional effectiveness of comforting strategies (Burleson & Samter, 1985). Results from the two studies indicate a correspondence between participants' perceptions of comforting strategy effectiveness and the hierarchical coding scheme previously developed by the researchers. This approach, then, has a practical application in enhancing the understanding of message strategies and has also been shown to be consistent with empirical data.

One criticism of this line of inquiry is that its use of written hypothetical situations or the laboratory context for data generation does not assess the way people "really act" when communicating with others. Burleson (in press) has two responses to this criticism: 1) the concern for

constructivists is that the individual is able to take a particular course of action, not that s/he consistently does act as reported, and 2) "there is good reason to believe that messages constructed in response to hypothetical situations constitute a valid assessment of 'real-world' communicative behavior" (p. 25).

Implications. Transformational linguistics, speech act theory, traditional interactional analysis, and message strategy and situation coding, as codification approaches to discourse analysis, have greatly influenced this area of communication inquiry. However, these approaches to discourse analysis have limited utility in understanding how coherent conversation is produced. In an effort to improve on this lack of explanatory power, several communication researchers have pursued lines of research focusing on how interactants coordinate their conversations. The degree to which these researchers have been successful in meeting their objective will be addressed in the following section.

Coordination of Conversation

The previous section discussed approaches to discourse analysis which codes or classifies discursive behaviors into discrete categories. While these may be useful in delineating different types of speech acts or messages, these coding schemes shed little light on how conversation is organized. The present section will explore approaches to discourse analysis which attempt to illuminate the issue of conversational coherence by focusing on how participants coordinate their communicative behaviors in the production of conversation.

Approaches to the coordination of conversation include conversational analysis, cognitive rules, and resource exchange. Conversational analysts focus on the structure of conversation, including turn-taking and sequencing (McLaughlin, 1984). Tracy (1985) examines cognitive rules in conversational coherence. The resource exchange model is exemplified by Dindia (1985), Roloff and Campion (1985), and Wiemann (1985). The utility of each approach will be discussed below.

Conversational Analysis. Like speech act theorists, conversational analysts are guided by rational empiricism methodology. As such, this approach shares many limitations with speech act theory, including a lack of generative capacity and not addressing the issue of the recursiveness of knowledge.

Conversational analysis is an attempt to integrate a greater number of communicative phenomena that what is possible in speech act theory. Interest is with sequences, such as openings, closings, arguments, and storytelling (McLaughlin, 1984). The unit of analysis is the functional unit, or adjacency pair, such as question-answer (Coulthard, 1977). Researchers employing the sequencing rules model argue that understanding the organization of conversation requires "consideration of larger units of conversation that have the character of sequences; that is a series of three or more speech acts that taken together may be seen to constitute a self-contained unit of discourse with a coherent internal structure" (McLaughlin, 1984, p. 169). The goal of conversational analysts is to identify the rules underlying the structure of sequences.

Conversational analysis assumes that coherence is found in the orderliness of the structural sequencing of adjacency pair parts (Jacobs & Jackson, 1983). Conversation exists as it does because "the structures of reality and of the mind are assumed to be isomorphic" (Pearce, et al, 1982, p. 17). However, this is discrepant with empirical evidence, as Jacobs and Jackson (1983) note that the sequencing rules model cannot account for "the apparent diversity of sequential expansions" (p. 50), or explain the conditions for sequences which are expansions and those which are unrelated to the conversation. Further, with its dependence on clock-time for orderliness (Cappella & Street, 1985), the sequential rules approach cannot take into account how interactants accomplish the organization of their conversation.

A more narrowly-defined area of conversational analysis includes those researchers interested in conversational and societal rules, and the actions communicators take to manage their and others' identities. While this rules perspective also identifies sequences, the assumption is "that meaning in social encounters is organized around the identities of the interacting parties" (McLaughlin, 1984, p. 202).

Preventatives and repairs are strategies interactants employ to manage their identities in light of breaches or possible breaches in conversational or societal rules (McLaughlin, 1984). Preventatives, which include disclaimers and licenses, are stated before the breach occurs. Repairs, which may be self or other initiated, occur after the breach.

The rationale for this line of inquiry stems from the cooperative principle and maxims posited by Grice (McLaughlin, 1984), discussed previously in speech act theory. Like Grice's maxims, preventatives and repairs are assumed to

exist within the conversational system. Cody and McLaughlin (1985a) describe accounting sequences, as one mechanism for repairing a breach, as "manifestations of a systematic provision in the organization of social interaction for the management of failure events" (p. 50). Research is concerned with the detection of sequences associated with preventative and repair strategies. Although the reason for initiating a preventative or repair is centered on identity management, the assumptions underlying this research are similar to those associated with the more general sequencing rules model. Coherence is thus situated within the conversational system.

Tracy (1985) argues that situating conventions and maxims entirely within the conversational system does not allow for sufficient explanation as to why conversation is organized in a particular manner. She suggests a rules approach which is cognitively oriented to explain the coordination of discourse.

Cognitive Rules. Whereas conversational analysts situate rules in the structure of the conversational system (Jacobs & Jackson, 1983), other discourse analysts take a more cognitive view of rules, locating rules within the individual. As Tracy (1985) explains this latter conceptualization of rules, "the focus is on the mental operations (information processing, storage and retrieval) that undergird rational behaviour" (p. 37). Tracy (1985) argues that a cognitively grounded rules approach accounts for both the consistency and variety in conversational coherence. "Because conversational behaviour is the product of intentional choice, rule rather than law-governed, variety is expected. Because communicators understand information presented

in some ways better than others, regularity is expected" (Tracy, 1985, p. 45). Her argument leans toward the constructivist tradition, describing individuals as choice-making agents, and begins to take into account the ability of the theorist to develop a theory.

McLaughlin's (1984) definition of rules, although less explicit, also focuses on mental processes. For McLaughlin (1984), "rules are probably best conceived as propositions that model, at varying levels of awareness, our understandings of the situated evaluation of social behavior, and the ways in which social interaction should be constituted and carried out" (p. 17). Rules are socially shared, allowing for the prediction, evaluation, and understanding of communicative behaviors.

This cognitive orientation to rules leads to "a choice perspective in which the actor uses (her/) his knowledge of context as a guide to appropriate behavior" (McLaughlin, 1984, p. 26). Discourse is coherent because social actors may employ rules which coordinate their behaviors with others. Behaviors may be described as rule-following, rule-according, rule-fulfilling, rule-violating, rule-ignorant, or rule-breaking (McLaughlin, 1984).

This list of possible rule-related behaviors leads to a major criticism of this line of inquiry: the endless spiral of rules, rules which are exceptions to rules, and rules which are exceptions to the exceptions. In addition, rules theorists do not indicate the criteria for rule application or violation (McLaughlin, 1984). This lack of specificity restricts the explanatory power of this approach and its generative capacity. As McLaughlin (1984) asserts, "rules theorists have, for the most part, contented themselves with simple descriptions of communicative phenomena, neglecting the larger scientific aims

of explanation and predictions" (p. 15). An attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive powers of coordination discourse theories is the impetus behind the social exchange or resource model of discourse.

Resource Model. Roloff and Campion (1985) and Wiemann (1985) expand the traditional view of interaction coordination to include the notion of resource exchange. Although these authors do not share identical conceptualizations of this approach, they agree that "an interaction is partly composed of exchanges of symbolic resources" (Roloff & Campion, 1985, p. 161). Similarly, Dindia (1985) describes self-disclosure as serving several functions, one of which is "an information exchange process, which is possibly governed by social exchange theories and/or norms of reciprocity" (p. 143). Underlying these approaches to discourse analysis is that individuals are followers of the hedonistic principle: Maximize one's gains and minimize one's costs.

As with conversational analysis, the resource model is guided by rules or principles inherent in the conversational system. These principles, and more specifically the norm of reciprocity, reflect the cognitive ordering of the mind (Roloff & Campion, 1985), indicating an adherence to rational empiricist methodology (Pearce, et al, 1982). The norm of reciprocity, like Grice's maxims, "provides a control mechanism for social interaction" (Roloff & Campion, 1985, p. 174). Wiemann (1985) is also concerned with control, viewing "turn taking in conversation . . . as an important example of how structural features can be manipulated to accomplish relational ends" (p. 98). Conversational events or behaviors are resources interactants may use in exploiting the structure of conversational organization. The coherence of

conversation is thus determined by the rules or norms governing the exchanges of symbolic resources.

Although this is an attempt to integrate communicative phenomena, the conceptualization of communicative acts as rewards or costs only serves to confound the understanding of discourse coherence. The delineation of rewards and costs is problematic, as Roloff and Campion (1985) have found, as is the determination of reciprocity. Dindia (1985) notes that "from these results it has been tentatively concluded that self-disclosure is reciprocal" (p. 156). This tentativeness she attributes to the difficulty in assessing what reciprocal behaviors entail.

For some communication theorists, this view of communication behavior is unpalatable. Not only does it assume an underlying capitalist motive for human action, it paints a Machiavellian picture of interactants. Further, while many Americans may follow hedonistic principles, this may not be true of other cultures, thus limiting the generality of this approach.

Implications. While coordination approaches to conversational coherence have provided greater insights than codification approaches into how talk is organized, this brief discussion has indicated the limitations of discourse analysis from a coordination perspective. Coordination approaches have yet to answer satisfactorily the question: "How is conversation organized?" Although individuals are generally seen as being able to choose different courses of action, behaviors still remain within the rules of the conversational system. Coordination is accomplished by operating in accordance with the already existing structure. This view of conversational

coherence ignores two crucial issues: time and change (Miller & Knapp, 1985). Communication theorists attempting to grapple with these properties of conversation have turned to a third perspective on conversational coherence, that of cooperation.

Cooperation in Accomplishment of Organized Discourse

In the final chapter of her text on the organization of discourse, McLaughlin (1984) suggests that future research on conversational coherence should include "greater attention to the goal-directed efforts of actors to achieve their aims through talk" (p. 268). This is precisely the direction researchers who view conversation as cooperative have taken. These approaches to conversational discourse assume that individuals begin with shared mechanisms or rules for organizing conversation, but these rules can be negotiated as interactants pursue their goals. The shift is from rules being followed for their own sake, the coordination approach to discourse analysis, to communicators accessing rules to achieve their goals. Conversation is a cooperative accomplishment, rather than a fitting together of behaviors within a prescribed pattern.

Theory and research within the cooperative perspective of discourse analysis have generally been guided by the metatheoretical assumptions of human systems methodology (Pearce, et al, 1982). Interactants are assumed to be rational or goal-oriented, and thus able to project a future in their communicative exchanges with others. Further, by integrating the constructivists' focus on cognitive processes with systemic notions of structural processes, theories within human systems methodology can address the issues of time and change in conversational coherence.

Research in this area has been concerned with micro levels of analysis, as with the work of Brown and Levinson (1978), Buttny (1985), Craig, et al (1986), Jacobs (1985), Morris (1985), and O'Keefe (1986), and more macro levels, as discussed by Poole (1985) and Putnam (1985). The utility of these cooperative approaches in enhancing the understanding of how communicators organize their conversations is assessed in the following sections.

Cooperative Dialogue. Several communication theorists have argued that traditional theories of discourse analysis do not adequately address the pragmatic aspects of language in conversational coherence (Burleson & Kline, 1979; Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs & Jackson, 1983; O'Keefe, et al, 1980; Putnam, 1985). The alternative models these authors propose share in common a view of individuals as rational or goal-seeking. Thus, O'Keefe (1986) suggests a rational goal analysis of discourse, Jacobs and Jackson (1983) outline a rational model, Brown and Levinson (1978) and Craig, et al (1986) explore the politeness phenomena, Buttny (1985) examines the accomplishment of accounts, Jacobs (1985) proposes an inferential/strategic model, Cicourel (1980) describes a problem-solving model, Morris (1985) addresses the notion of rule negotiation in conversational organization from an alignment approach, and Patterson (1985) delineates a sequential functional model of nonverbal exchange. These discourse analysts are addressing the issues raised by O'Keefe, et al (1980) in their argument that the organization of conversation is schematic, local to the ongoing interaction, hierarchic, historically emergent, and an interactional achievement.

One strength of these approaches to conversational organization is the integration of a number of communicative phenomena. For example, Jacobs and Jackson's (1983) rational model and Jacobs' (1985) inferential/strategic model incorporate and go beyond the sequencing rules model's adjacency pairs, to conceptualize the adjacency pair as "a limited special case of a general rational structure" (Jacobs & Jackson, 1983, p. 60). The adjacency pair is just one option communicators employ in the rational process of cooperatively conversing. The problem-solving model views communicators in a similar fashion, requiring that researchers identify the participants' goals, intentions, and perceptions in discourse episodes which will account for discourse content (Cicourel, 1980).

Brown and Levinson's (1978) study most clearly indicates the generality of a cooperative perspective on discourse analysis. As Craig, et al (1986) assert, Brown and Levinson "have given us a powerful and highly suggestive theory of discourse that poses important issues for communication research" (p. 462). Although claiming a constructivist position, Brown and Levinson (1978), lean toward human systems methodology in their concern with cross-cultural phenomena (Pearce, et al, 1982). Brown and Levinson (1978) argue that cultural rules and norms are superficial differences in social behavior, which can only be understood in terms of universal principles related to rationality and face wants. In conversation, rational agents with certain face wants choose strategies when managing face threats that maximize their goal attainment. Further, "the output of the system is not then parallel to the output of a generative grammar . . . so much as to a model of the process from thought to sentence" (Brown & Levinson, 1978, p. 90). Brown and Levinson's (1978) research indicates that this process accounts for cross-cultural politeness phenomena.

One criticism of discourse analysis, noted in the previous discussion of interaction coding, is that the narrow focus on verbal behavior ignores nonverbal behavior (e.g., Burgoon, 1985; McLaughlin, 1984). Codification approaches have attempted to remedy this situation by classifying nonverbal behaviors in a manner similar to that of coding speech acts, as with Burgoon's (1985) description of nonverbal signals. Coordination theorists are concerned with nonverbal behaviors because "nonverbal behaviors may provide important cues to conversational structure" (McLaughlin, 1984, p. 246). Cooperation adherents, on the other hand, view nonverbal communication as similar to rules in that nonverbal behaviors are accessed by conversing interactants to achieve communicative goals. In developing a sequential functional model of nonverbal communication, Patterson (1985) explains how nonverbal behaviors are used by interactants in the cooperative production of conversation. This incorporation of nonverbal acts in discourse analysis further demonstrates the generality of the cooperative perspective.

For theorists within the coordination perspective, coherence is a result of rules inherent in the conversational structure. Communicative phenomena exist as they do because of system characteristics. Theorists working within the cooperative perspective specify the nature of the necessity much differently. For example, Jacobs (1985) describes conversation as a "problem-solving activity involving the assessment of mutual knowledge in the generation of speaker plans and hearer inferences as to the most plausible solution for what that speaker plan might be" (p. 336). As Jacobs and Jackson (1983) suggest with their rational model, the coherence of a conversation is identified in participants' goal orientation, or the relation of their utterances to a goal or goals, and the alignment of participants' actions and beliefs to each other

and the social system. The logic of conversational coherence, then, is found both in interactants' goals and the structural processes of conversation.

Because cooperative approaches to discourse have a high degree of generality and provide an explanation as to why conversation is coherent, they allow for an understanding of conversational coherence not possible with codification and coordination perspectives. As McLaughlin (1984) laments about the literature on adjacency pairs, "Not only have there been no serious efforts to account of why some acts set up expectations that other particular acts will follow, but hard evidence that adjacency-pair organization is pervasive is simply not there" (p. 267). Both how conversation is organized and why conversation is organized as it is are explained in the cooperative perspective. For example, Jacobs and Jackson's (1983) rational model of conversational coherence is able to explain why sequentially disordered, as well as ordered, conversations are coherent by identifying the functional properties of speech acts in conversation. Further, in enhancing the understanding of conversational coherence, the cooperative perspective demonstrates a capacity to facilitate new lines of thought and research. O'Keefe (1986) provides an example of the generative capacity of a cooperative orientation to discourse in her expansion of rational goal analysis. This communication researcher introduces the notion of message design logics, or communication-constituting concepts, to explain observed differences in how communicators construct messages and organize talk.

The generative capacity of cooperative models of discourse organization has also led to new research pursuits in this area. O'Keefe and Delia (in press) cite several studies which have found that differences in social cognition

structures lead to differences in the definition of interactional situations, and therefore, differences in the strategies used to achieve situational goals. Similarly, the findings from O'Keefe's (1986) research employing a rational goal analysis of verbal messages support the utility of the model and the integration of the message design logics construct in the analysis. In his discussion of rules negotiations, Morris (1985) examined transcripts from student-teacher conferences to detect how interactants proceed when they experience dispreferred outcomes, and rules then become substantive issues. Brown and Levinson's (1978) data set "consist(ed) in first-hand tape-recorded usage for three languages: English (from both sides of the Atlantic): Tzeltal, a Mayan language spoken in the community of Tenejapa in Chiapas, Mexico; and South Indian Tamil from a village in the Coimbatore District of Tamilnadu" (p. 64). Clearly these researchers have presented empirical evidence to support their claims.

The cooperative perspective integrates cognitive, contextual, and social processes in its view of conversational coherence. In this manner, theories within this perspective address the notion of recursivity and are able to account for a theorist having developed them. As O'Keefe, et al (1980) state, "the individual never confronts reality directly, but always through the use of interpretive schemes" (p. 26). Thus, the relationship between theory and the theorist in the process of theorizing is implicitly recognized in the cooperative perspective.

Cooperation in Context. A criticism frequently aimed at discourse analysis is that its focus is rather myopic. Cicourel (1980), consistent with his

ethnomethodological concerns, argues that discourse analysis has suffered from an inattention to the larger structural setting in which discourse in embedded. To address the constraints which contextual factors impose on conversational coherence, Cicourel (1980) suggests "focusing on occasions which are central to an organization's or group's everyday existence" (p. 130). A few discourse analysts have, at least in part, heeded Cicourel's suggestion. Putnam (1985) examines bargaining as a process at several levels, including recurring bargaining events and intra-organizational bargaining. The theory of structuration is developed by Poole (1985) to explain how the sequences in group functioning develop. These authors highlight the pragmatic applicability of cooperative approaches to discourse coherence.

For interaction analysts such as Ellis (1979), Emery (1982), Millar and Rogers (1976), and Rogers and Farace (1975), the meaning of discourse is found in the system's pattern or structure (Pearce, et al, 1982). This is not the view of structure taken by Poole (1985) or Putnam (1985). These authors cast structure as a logical force in discourse to explain why discourse phenomena exist as they do. The pragmatic model of negotiation presented by Putnam (1985) posits interaction sequences as producing the structure of the bargaining process, which then determines the outcomes of the negotiations. Structure, however, can also redefine interactants' goals and strategies employed, thus influencing interaction sequences. Poole (1985) addresses the notion of recursivity more directly: "Thus <u>structuration</u> --production and reproduction of social systems via the application of generative rules and resources--operates in a recursive fashion: the very rules and resources interactors use are produced and recreated in the ongoing interaction . . . . System and structures codetermine each other" (p. 213). Communication

phenomena exist as they do because social reality is both created and constrained in human interaction. Coherence is not simply the result of cooperative actions, but is created through patterned interactions, which in turn constrain those interactions.

As discussed in the previous section, one of the strengths of the cooperative perspective is that it recognizes the recursiveness of knowledge. Poole (1985) explicitly acknowledges the role of human thought in conversation: "The play of human creativity in the interaction system can introduce structural changes that are reproduced and thereby become abiding structural features" (p. 213). Unlike coordination approaches which see individuals as simply active choice-makers, cooperative approaches see individuals as creative, and therefore capable of theorizing.

Another strength previously identified in the cooperative dialogue approaches is their success in integrating a large number of intricately-linked communicative phenomena. This is also evident in Poole's (1985) and Putnam's (1985) work. Both provide a broad framework for studying the organization of communicative behaviors. Poole (1985) integrates and demonstrates the mutual determination of structures, which are the conversational rules and resources participants may access in interactions, and systems, which are the outcomes of the interactions. Putnam (1985) seeks to identify the phases of the bargaining process as they are manifested in interaction sequences. Her suggestions for future research in the area indicate the generality of a cooperative perspective, and the ability of theories within this perspective to launch new ideas: "We need to examine how bargainers incorporate contextual factors such as bargaining history, state

laws and organizational constraints on their interaction . . . . (W)e need to broaden our focus to tap the intergroup as well as the interpersonal dimensions of negotiations" (Putnam, 1985, p. 239). Putnam (1985) advocates the integration of relevant contextual features into bargaining process models to accomplish these research objectives. While Poole (1985) states that his theory of structuration is not fully defined, he seems to be taking the direction Putnam (1985) suggests.

What is lacking most from these researchers is empirical evidence to support their models. Both acknowledge this situation, providing disclaimers and calling for further research in the conclusions of their articles. As Putnam (1985) notes, "Analysis of bargaining is in a state of infancy; hence the conclusions drawn from this review are at best tentative and speculative" (p. 236). The need for more research, however, is certain, and it is to the future directions of study in conversational coherence that we must now turn.

Conversation as Cooperation: Future Directions

> "It has been a long trip," said Milo, climbing onto the couch where the princesses sat; "but we would have been here much sooner if I hadn't made so many mistakes. I'm afraid it's all my fault."
>
> "You must never feel badly about making mistakes," explained Reason quietly, "as long as you take the trouble to learn from them. For you often learn more by being wrong for the right reasons than you do by being right for the wrong reasons."
>
> "But there's so much to learn," he said, with a thoughtful frown.
>
> "Yes, that's true," admitted Rhyme; "but it's not just learning things that's important. It's learning what to do with what you learn and learning why you learn things at all that matters." (Juster, 1961, p. 233).

As with Milo's journey, the path from Chomsky's transformational linguistics to Putnam's pragmatic model of negotiation has neither been direct nor predictable. Implicitly agreeing with Reason, Harre (1972) asserts that "science proceeds by a sort of leap-frogging process of discovery" (p. 171) with the development of scientific ideas being more discontintuous than additive. Supporting Rhyme's concern with the learning process, Harre (1972) further argues: "Scientific work is as much a work of the imagination as it is work at the laboratory bench . . . . Science is not natural history, it is not the accumulation of facts. It is the building of a picture of the world" (p. 23). "Doing science" is not the value-free mechanistic process envisioned by the logical empiricist. It is a creative endeavor very much guided by the researcher's imaginative capacities.

This philosophy of science has come critical implications for scientific theory, and more importantly for the present purposes, human communication theory. As metaphors, "theories are fictions, that is that they are to facts roughly as novels are to histories . . . . (Theories) are works of the imagination and nothing else" (Harre, 1972, p. 80). What we "know" is a function of the richness of the metaphor used in the process of knowing. Theories, then, are neither true nor false, but vary in their power to describe and explain what it is the theorist wishes to examine. The felicity conditions employed in identifying the utility of current communication theories in discourse analysis clearly indicate that all theories of conversation are not equally useful for understanding how talk is organized.

This does not mean, however, that there is only one way to do discourse analysis. To the contrary, Pearce, et al (1982) advocate an open-mindedness

to a spectrum of theoretical orientations. These communication theorists argue in favor of the stance of the "committed agnostic," who admits the possibility of another theory (or theories) which may meet the felicity conditions for a useful theory more completely than the theory s/he ascribes to. From the present analysis and critique of approaches to conversational coherence, it is evident that several theoretical frameworks merit pursuit. Further, it is evident that those incorporating both constructivist and systemic metatheoretical assumptions, those approaches within the cooperative perspective, are the most powerful and demonstrate the greatest promise in enhancing the understanding of how discourse is organized.

At a micro-level, O'Keefe (1986) further refines rational goal analysis by positing the notion of message design logics which are basic beliefs individuals have about communication and its functions. O'Keefe (1986) argues that an individual has one of three message design logics: expressive, conventional, or rhetorical. These message design logics undergird the ways in which individuals use messages, with differences evident in complex or problematic situations requiring the integration of multiple goals. This line of inquiry is useful for examining individual differences in message production and differences in how interactants conceptualize coherent discourse.

A second line of research is one frequently ignored in discourse analysis, that of nonverbal communication. Patterson (1985) observes that previous studies attempting to link nonverbal behavioral patterns with particular effects have met with limited success. To avoid this problem, Patterson (1985) proposes a sequential functional model of nonverbal communication which

is concerned with the functions of nonverbal behaviors in relation to interpersonal involvement. Intimacy, social control, and service-task are the three molar functions the author identifies. Nonverbal behaviors may be classified based on their function for interpersonal involvement in the interaction. Therefore, several patterns of behavior may serve the same function, and several functions may be served by the same pattern of nonverbal behaviors. Patterson (1985) is, then, focusing on sequences of nonverbal behaviors which communicators employ in achieving their communicative goals. This shifts the focus from individual nonverbal acts (e.g., Burgoon, 1985), to the use of nonverbal behaviors in regulating and organizing conversation.

The final area of study which will be discussed here is Poole's (1985) work in small group processes. As previously noted, the importance of this research is that it presents a more macro-level view not typically found in discourse analyses. Further, the model of structuration developed by the author is explicit in its metatheoretical assumptions as well as research implications. This approach to small group processes provides explanations for observed sequences and patterns not possible with simple models of group phases.

O'Keefe (1986), Patterson (1985), and Poole (1985) are examples of directions for future discourse analysis research, but by no means is this an exhaustive list. As theories within the cooperative perspective, these models give discourse analysts a new look at conversational coherence. Pursuits within this perspective have not fully answered the question, "How is talk organized?" but have significantly altered the way discourse analysts search for the answers. As McLaughlin (1984) observes, "speech act theory seems to

have become stuck in a rut, with researchers showing lots of interest in indirect requests, and very little interest in anything else" (p. 267). Codification and coordination approaches are "stuck in a rut," with the former intent on classifying bits of conversation into discrete categories, and the latter bogged down in a maze of rules. This brief review of inquiry within the cooperative perspective demonstrates the liberating effect it has had on discourse analysis. Small group behavior, bargaining, communication-constituting concepts, identity management, the integration of multiple goals, rule negotiation, and nonverbal communication have all been addressed by discourse analysts who view the accomplishment of conversation as cooperative.

The methods for doing discourse analysis have also shifted, with researchers integrating qualitative and quantitative methods. Further, coherence is examined at multiple levels, including the individual, dyad, and small groups, and in a variety of contexts, such as organizations, bargaining situations, and different cultures.

Cooperative approaches to conversational coherence, informed by human systems metatheoretical assumptions, hold great promise for enhancing the understanding of how conversation is accomplished. Several theories of discourse organization have been shown to merit further pursuit. Following the path these theorists have indicated is not only the task of those who are labeled "discourse analysts," but all those communication scholars who are interested in understanding messages and the complexities of conversational coherence.

References

Austin, J. (1962) How to Do Things With Words. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bennett, W., & Edleman, M. (1985) Toward a new political narrative. Journal of Communication, 35, 156-171.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1978) Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena. In E. Goody (Ed.), Questions and Politeness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 56-289.

Burgoon, J. (1985) Nonverbal signals. In M. Knapp & G. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of Interpersonal Communication, Beverly Hills: Sage, 344-390.

Burgoon, J., & Hale, J. (1984) The fundamental topoi of relational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 193-214.

Burleson, B. (in press) Cognitive complexity and person-centered communication. In J. McCroskey & J. Daly (Eds.), Personality and Interpersonal Communication. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Burleson, B., & Kline, S. (1979) Habermas' theory of communication. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65, 412-428.

Burleson, B., & Samter, W. (1985) Consistencies in theoretical and naive evaluations of comforting messages. Communication Monographs, 52, 103-123.

Buttny, R. (1985) Accounts as a reconstruction of an event's context. Communication Monographs, 52, 57-77.

Cappella, J., & Street, R. (1985) Introduction: A functional approach to the structure of communicative behaviour. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 1-29.

Carbaugh, D. (1985) Cultural communication and organizing. In W. Gudykunst, L. Stewart, & S. Ting-Toomey (Eds.), Communication, Culture, and Organizational Processes, Beverly Hills: Sage, 30-48.

Cicourel, A. (1980) Three modes of discourse analysis: The role of social structure. Discourse Processes, 3, 101-132.

Cody, M., & McLaughlin, M. (1985a) Models for the sequential construction of accounting episodes: situation and interactional constraints on message selection and evaluation. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 50-69.

Cody, M., & McLaughlin, M. (1985b) The situation as a construct in interpersonal communication research. In M. Knapp & G. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of Interpersonal Communication, Beverly Hills: Sage, 263-311.

Cody, M., McLaughlin, M., & Scheider, M. (1981) The impact of relational consequences and intimacy on the selection of interpersonal persuasion tactics: A reanalysis. Communication Quarterly, 29, 91-106.

Conrad, C. (1985) Chrysanthemums and swords: A reading of contemporary organizational communication theory and research. Southern Speech Communication Journal, 50, 189-200.

Coulthard, M. (1977) Introduction to Discourse Analysis. London: Longman.

Craig, R., Tracy, K., & Spisak, F. (1986) The discourse of requests: Assessment of a politeness approach. Human Communication Research, 12, 437-468.

Dillard, J., & Burgoon, M. (1985) Situational influences on the selection of compliance-gaining messages: Two tests of the predictive utility of the cody-mclaughlin typology. Communication Monographs, 52, 289-304.

Dindia, K. (1985) A functional approach to self-disclosure. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 142-160.

Ellis, D. (1979) Relational control in two group systems. Communication Monographs, 46, 153-166.

Emery, D. (1982) Marital interaction: Perceptions and behavioral implications of control. In M. Burgoon (Ed.), Communication Yearbook, 6, Beverly Hills: Sage, 489-505.

Fitzpatrick, M., & Badzinski, D. (1985) All in the family: Interpersonal communication in kin relationships. In M. Knapp & G. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of Interpersonal Communication, Beverly Hills: Sage, 687-736.

Folger, J., & Poole, M. (1982) Relational coding schemes: The question of validity. In M. Burgoon (Ed.), Communication Yearbook, 5, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 235-247.

Harre, R. (1972) The Philosophies of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1983) Generalizing about messages: Suggestions for design and analysis of experiments. Human Communication Research, 9, 169-191.

Jacobs, S. (1985) Language. In M. Knapp & G. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of Interpersonal Communication, Beverly Hills: Sage, 313-343.

Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (1983) Speech act structure in conversation: Rational aspects of pragmatic coherence. In R. Craig & K. Tracy (Eds.), Conversational Coherence, Beverly Hills: Sage, 47-66.

Juster, N. (1961) The Phantom Tollbooth. New York: Random House.

Knapp, M. (1984) Series editor's foreward. In M. McLaughlin, Conversation: How Talk is Organized. Beverly Hills: Sage, 9-10.

Knapp, M., & Miller, G. (1985) Handbook of Interpersonal Communication. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Littlejohn, S. (1983) Theories of Human Communication, 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Mark, R. (1971) Coding communication at the relationship level. Journal of Communication, 21, 221-232.

McLaughlin, M. (1984) Conversation: How Talk is Organized. Beverly Hills: Sage.

McQuillen, J. (1986) The development of listener-adapted compliance-resisting strategies. Human Communication Research, 12, 359-375.

Millar, F., & Rogers, E. (1976) A relational approach to interpersonal communication. In G. Miller (Ed.), Explorations in Interpersonal Communication, Beverly Hills: Sage, 87-103.

Miller, G., & Knapp, M. (1985) Introduction: Background and current trends in the study of interpersonal communication. In M. Knapp & G. Miller, (Eds.), Handbook of Interpersonal Communication, Beverly Hills: Sage, 7-25.

Morris, G. (1985) The remedial episode as a negotiation of rules. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 70-84.

O'Donnell-Trujillo, N. (1981) Relational communication: Comparison of coding systems. Communication Monographs, 48, 91-105.

O'Keefe, B. (1986) The logic of message design: Evidence for individual differences in reasoning about communication. Unpublished manuscript, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, February.

O'Keefe, B., & Delia, J. (in press) Psychological and interactional dimensions of communicative development. In H. Giles & R. St. Clair (Eds.), Recent Advances in Language, Communication, and Social Psychology, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

O'Keefe, B., Delia, J., & O'Keefe, D. (1980) Interaction analysis and the organization of interaction. In N. Denzin (Ed.), Studies in Symbolic Interaction, 3, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 25-57.

Patterson, M. (1985) The evolution of a functional model of nonverbal exchange: A personal perspective. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 190-205.

Pearce, W., & Cronen, V. (1980) Communication, Action, and Meaning. New York: Praeger.

Pearce, W., Cronen, V., & Harris, L. (1982) Methodological considerations in building human communication theory. In F. Dance (Ed.), Human Communication Theory: Comparative Issues, New York: Harper and Row, 1-41.

Pike, G., & Sillars, A. (1985) Reciprocity of marital communication. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 2, 130-143.

Poole, M. (1985) Tasks and interaction sequences: A theory of coherence in group decision-making interaction. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 206-224.

Putnam, L. (1985) Bargaining as task and process: Multiple functions of interactional sequences. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 225-242.

Rogers, E., & Millar, F. (1982) The question of validity. In M. Burgoon (Ed.), Communication Yearbook, 5, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 249-257.

Rogers, L. E., & Farace, R. (1975) Analysis of relational communication in dyads: New measurement procedures. Human Communication Research, 1, 222-239.

Roloff, M., & Campion, D. (1985) Conversational profit-seeking: interaction as social exchange. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 161-189.

Ting-Toomey, S. (1983) An analysis of verbal communication patterns in high and low marital satisfaction groups. Human Communication Research, 9, 306-319.

Tracy, K. (1985) Conversational coherence: A cognitively grounded rules approach. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.), Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 30-49.

Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J., & Jackson, D. (1967) Pragmatics of Human Communication. New York: Norton.

Wiemann, J. (1985) Interpersonal control and regulation in conversation. In R. Street & J. Cappella (Eds.) Sequence and Pattern in Communicative Behaviour, London: Edward Arnold, 85-102.

Willbrand, M., & Rieke, R. (1986) Reason giving in children's supplicatory compliance gaining. Communication Monographs, 53, 47-60.

Wiseman, R., & Schenck-Hamlin, W. (1981) A multidimensional scaling validation of an inductively derived set of compliance gaining strategies. Communication Monographs, 48, 251-270.

Witteman, H., & Fitzpatrick, M. (1986) Compliance-gaining in marital interaction: Power bases, processes, and outcomes. Communication Monographs, 53, 130-143.